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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALEM CITY, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant : 
vs. : Case No. 
870347-CA 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH, ; 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment by the Eighth Circuit 
Court, Spanish Fork Department. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(c). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is the term "occupied trailer house or mobile home" used 
in Salem Zoning Ordinance 3-17 limited to human occupation or 
does it also mean use of the trailer house or mobile home for 
storage? 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant Farnsworth was charged with improper location 
of a trailer house or mobile home in Salem on March 25, 1987, 
a Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Salem City 
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Zoning Ordinance Section 3-17. 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES 
Salem Zoning Ordinance Sections 2-8 and 3-17. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At a pre-trial conference on May 26, 1987, all material 
facts were stipulated to by the parties. Farnsworth 
stipulated that he located a trailer house on his property 
within Salem City Limits at the time charged and that such 
location was not in a licensed trailer court or mobile home 
park. Farnsworth further stipulated that at the time 
charged, he used the trailer house for storage and the City 
stipulated that at the time charged, no one resided in the 
trailer house. 
The trial court determined that the case must turn on 
the definition of the term "occupied trailer house" as used 
in Salem Ordinance 3-17 and that since the ordinance did not 
define "occupy" that the word should be defined narrowly to 
mean human habitation. The Court therefore entered a verdict 
of acquittal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The term "occupied trailer house" as used in Salem 
Ordinance 3-17 is not limited to occupancy by human 
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h a b i t a t i o n , but i nc ludes o the r uses and in p a r t i c u l a r 
s torage use. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DEFINED 
"OCCUPIED TRAILER HOUSE OR MOBILE HOME" 
AS USED IN SALEM ZONING ORDINANCE 3-17 
AS REQUIRING HUMAN HABITATION. 
The applicable Salem ordinance reads as follows: 
2-8 Definitions — Mobile Home shall mean a dwelling 
unit, except a sectional home or modular home, designed 
to be transported after fabrication on its own wheels 
or detachable wheels and which is ready for occupancy 
as an independent dwelling unit except for connection 
to utilities and/or location on a foundation. The term 
mobile home shall not include conventional houses which 
are manufactured elsewhere and moved into an area for 
use as permanent housing. 
3-17 Trailer Houses and Mobile Homes. No occupied 
trailer I house or mobile home shall be permitted in 
Salem City, Utah, except under the following 
conditions: 
1. When the trailer house or mobile home is located in 
a licensed trailer court or mobile home park. 
2. When the trailer house or mobile home is located on 
a lot on which a building is being constructed, 
provided a permit to construct a building on such lot 
has been obtained from the zoning administrator, but in 
no event shall the trailer or mobile home be occupied 
in excess of one year without consent of the Salem City 
Council. 
The Trial Court defined "occupy" as used in the 
ordinance to mean "human habitation". Salem respectfully 
disagrees. The term "occupy" is not expressly defined in 
the Salem Ordinance. Undefined words in a zoning ordinance 
will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Wiggers vs. 
Skagit County, 596 P2d 1345, (Wash. App. 1979) and Town of 
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Greenland v. Bunker, 384 A2d 321 (New Hampshire, 1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court was confronted with the 
contention that in order to be an occupant of real property a 
claimant must reside thereon. The Court said 
This is not the law. Occupancy does not 
necessarily include residence. Webster defines 
"occupancy" as the "act of taking or holding 
possession;" and an "occupant" as "one who 
occupies, or takes possession; one who has the 
actual use or possession, or is in possession, of a 
thing." In 2 Ralpj & Lawrence's Dictionary, 893, 
we find that "in its usual sense, occupancy is when 
a person exercises physical control over land." In 
the case of Fleming v. Maddox, 30 Iowa 239 the 
court said: "A mechanic is in the occupation of his 
shop when he carries on his business; a merchant, 
of his store; a lawyer, of his office; a farmer, 
his farm. It is not necessary, to make his 
occupation complete, that the mechanic should 
reside in his shop, or upon the same lot. He is in 
occupation because he uses and enjoys it in 
carrying on his legitimate calling., So with the 
merchant, the lawyer, the farmer" (Twiggs v. Land 
Commissioners 27 Utah 245:246, 75 Pac. 729, 1904) 
As noted by the Court in the Twiggs case, one does not have 
to dwell in a building to occupy it. 
In this case, Salem Ordinance 2-8 defines a mobile 
home as "a dwelling unit . . . " Salem submits that because 
a trailer house is defined as a dwelling unit, does not 
limit occupancy to use of the mobile home as a human 
habitation. A fair interpretation of the ordinance requires 
the conclusion that occupancy as used in the ordinance was 
intended to be broader than that. Using the mobile home for 
storage and not to live in does not make it any less a 
mobile home. A trailer house is still a trailer house 
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whether lived in or used for some other purpose. It is the 
fact of use rather than the kind of use which makes the 
occupancy. 
Under the police power, government entities all over 
the country regulate the location and establish conditions 
under which trailer houses may be used. These regulations 
are required because of special problems which trailer house 
use entails. For example, trailers are more vulnerable to 
wind upset, are more liable to burn than regular housing and 
may be out of place architecturally if located in the midst 
of more conventional buildings. They are often located very 
close together which compounds these problems. It is 
illogical to suppose that Salem intended other than the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the word "occupied" in Salem 
Ordinance 3-17. To say that Salem intended this word to mean 
solely human habitation would frustrate the obvious intention 
of the City Council. 
CONCLUSION 
An occupied trailer house as referred to in Salem Zoning 
Ordinance 3-17 includes the use of a trailer house as a 
storage facility and therefore the decision of the Circuit 
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Court Judge should be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<yw\ 
Richard M. Taylor for 
Tayl&r & Taylor 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
Salem Ordinances 
2-8 Definitions — Mobile Home shall mean a dwelling unit, 
except a sectional home or modular home, designed to be 
transported after fabrication on its own wheels or detachable 
wheels and which is ready for occupancy as an independent 
dwelling unit except for connection to utilities and/or 
location on a foundation. The term mobile home shall not 
include conventional houses which are manufactured elsewhere 
and moved into an area for use as permanent housing. 
3-17 Trailer Houses and Mobile Homes. No occupied trailer 
house or mobile home shall be permitted in Salem City, Utah, 
except under the following conditions: 
1. When the trailer house or mobile home is located in 
a licensed trailer court or mobile home park. 
2. When the trailer house or mobile home is located on 
a lot on which a building is being constructed, provided a 
permit to construct a building on such lot has been obtained 
from the zoning administrator, but in no event shall the 
trailer or mobile home be occupied in excess of one year 
without consent of the Salem City Council. 
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SALEM CITY 
vs 
CIRCUIT COURL STATE OF UTAH 
SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
Plaintiff 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH 
Defendant 
R U L I N G 
CASE NO. 87 CR-202 
This matter came before the Court for Pretrial Conference on the 26th 
day of May, 1987. It was agreed between the parties that the only issue 
remaining was a question and the case was submitted to the Court by memor-
anda in lieu of trial. 
After considering the memoranda of counsel, it appears that the case 
must turn on the definition of the term "occupied trailer house". The 
stipulated facts are to the effect that the trailer is no longer lived in 
but is used for storage. The Ordinance itself is not helpful by providing 
a definition. While several possible definitions of "occupy" may be broad 
enough to include mere possession or storage, it appears to the Court that 
the narrowest fair definitions consistent with the purposes of the statute 
l i s U i a L u C u a p y Ui^ctu^ "IiLUilcUi IicU-* I LaLlv^i»t>" . 
Accordingly, the Court finds and so males that the City has failed to 
carry its burden or proof and enters a verdict of acquittal. 
DATED: June 29, 1987 
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